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1 Introduction
The Chief Special Prosecutor in his latest report to the House of Peoples
Representatives (Federal Parliament) on 4 February 2010 indicated that
the trials which started eighteen years ago against former Ethiopian
government officials accused of committing various international crimes
would come to an end in two months’ time. In his report – which appears
to be the last major report of such nature – he indicated that 384 criminal
investigation files were opened in various regions of the country in Addis
Ababa (Federal Court) and in the Oromia, Amhara, Tigray, Harari and
South Regional states. The case of Special Prosecutor v Colonel Mengistu
Haile-Mariam & Others is the most prominent of these. This essay examines
these trials by the federal courts and their contributions to post-conflict
justice in Ethiopia. 
2 Brief history
The historical events the trials aim to address are the results of the political
upheaval that followed the 1974 revolution which brought down the
several thousand year-old monarchy. By historical accident, more than
one hundred junior officers who were spontaneously sent to Addis Ababa
from various divisions of the Army and Police to negotiate with the
Emperor about various administrative matters, unexpectedly ended up
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becoming collective heads of state. There was no plan to their rise to
power, but they were aided by the deteriorating conditions and the popular
anger against the ageing monarch’s inability to solve various deep-rooted
problems faced by the country. They called themselves the Derg
(committee or council). Long before Derg members got proficient in the
language of Marxist-Leninism and tried to ally themselves with or against
various radical students and intellectuals-led groups of similar persuasion,
they had started their killing spree by summarily executing sixty officials of
the former regime and by carrying out purges within their own ranks. The
sixty former officials that included the former long-time Prime Minister,
Ministers, various army generals and feudal Lords, were killed by a
decision of the Derg committee members. Emperor Haileselassie himself
was killed in prison sometime later. 
The Derg-led revolution started to claim more victims when an
ideological battle between various factions started - drawing from Marxist
interpretations.1 Political parties started mushrooming. The Haileselassie
I University, later renamed Addis Ababa University, was one of the main
breeding grounds of student political movements. Some activists who were
in exile saw an opportunity and returned home, forming their own political
parties and even advising the junta. All sought to influence the direction of
the revolution. Strategy wise, while some were directly opposed to the Derg
from the start; others saw a short-cut to power, piggybacking the Derg. In
the end, the junior officers, led by Mengistu Haile-Mariam, managed to
destroy their opponents until it was their turn to be ousted from power
seventeen years later. 
The ideological battle of controlling the hearts and minds of the
populace reached a new level when adversaries from both sides decided to
physically eliminate each other’s key figures. The lexicons of White Terror
and Red Terror, copycats from the brutal Russian and other revolutions,
became the staples of Ethiopian ‘revolutionaries’. To this date, many
Ethiopian political parties – including the governing party – carry the word
‘revolutionary’ as part of their official names. 
At the height of this abuse of power the Derg empowered its security
apparatus – urban and rural dweller associations of militias – to kill, torture
and maim with impunity anybody they labeled ‘subversives’, ‘anti-
revolutionaries’, ‘counter-revolutionaries’, or ‘anti people’. At the end of
the campaign, tens of thousands of people were either killed or had
disappeared. Leaving other controversial figures aside, the charges filed by
the Special Prosecutor, obviously a conservative figure, lists 12315
1 The history of the Red Terror is very contentious with regards as to who started it, how
many people suffered and the respective roles of the various warring parties. See B
Zewde ‘The history of the Red Terror: Contexts and consequences’ in K Tronvoll, C
Schaefer & GA Aneme (eds) The Ethiopian Red Terror trials: Transitional justice challenged
(2009)17-32.
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individuals as killed and the courts thus far have found that 9546 of these
were indeed victims of the crimes perpetrated during this period. Of these,
228 victims were females.2 Furthermore, 1500 victims were confirmed by
the courts as having suffered bodily injury.3 The charges also included
2681 individuals as victims of torture, and the courts have confirmed 1687
of these cases. Of these, 172 were females.4 These numbers do not
necessarily represent the actual number of victims; as in addition to those
directly killed, those whose lives were cut short due to misguided polices
of the Derg could run into millions. 
3 Post-conflict justice
The notion of post-conflict justice is sometimes used interchangeably with
concepts such as ‘transitional justice’, ‘strategies for combating impunity’,
‘peace building’ and ‘post conflict reconstruction.’5 Post-conflict justice is
a delicate matter. There is no formula that applies to all countries. An ideal
model of post-conflict justice has to balance the demands of justice, peace
and reconciliation in society. These three demands do not necessarily sit
together in harmony. The Chicago Principles of Post-conflict Justice put
together by eminent legal and transitional justice experts indicate that the
following factors need to be taken into account: ‘human suffering and
demands for justice; grounding in international law; accountability, peace
and democracy; victim centered approach; context-specific strategies;
interdisciplinary nature and long term commitment.’6 Undoubtedly, the
legal process is but only one way of addressing the past. Thus:
The Chicago Principles on Post-Conflict Justice present the search for
accountability in the aftermath of conflict as a complex, multifaceted,
interdisciplinary process that extends beyond a formal legalistic approach.
Domestic and international prosecutions on their own rarely provide victims
and a suffering society with a complete approach to justice for past atrocities.
Relying solely on formal legal action generally fails to fully address victims’
2 Report of the SPO of 4 February 2010 to the House of Peoples’ Representative. See the
documentary produced by the state-run Ethiopian Television in Amharic which
includes the SPO Report as well as MP comments on this video-sharing website http://
www.ethiotube.net/video/8192/Documentary--findings-of-human-rights-abuses-
during-Red-Terror-era--Part-1 (part I) and http://www.ethiotube.net/video/8194/
Documentary--findings-of-human-rights-abuses-during-Red-Terror-era--Part-2 (Part II)
(both accessed 1 June 2010). For an interview with the Special Prosecutor in Amharic
(The Reporter Amharic News Paper, 7 February 2010), see http://
www.ethiopianreporter.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1159:
q--q&catid=100:2009-11-13-13-45-06&Itemid=619 (accessed 1 June 2010). For an
immediate reaction to the report in transitional justice context, see L Degu Report from
Special Prosecutor Office of Ethiopia: Half-Way Transitional Justice, 11 February 2010
http://www.ictj.org/en/news/coverage/article/3447.html (accessed 1 June 2010).
3 Report (n 2 above).
4 As above.
5 Chicago Principles on Post-Conflict Justice (2007) 7 http://www.isisc.org/public/
chicago%20principles%20-%20final%20-%20may%209%202007.pdf (accessed 1 June
2010).
6 As above, 15.
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needs and may reveal serious limitations within a transitional government
that weakens society’s faith in the legitimacy of judicial processes.
That is why several measures ought to be considered cumulatively in
addressing legacies of past human rights violations. These consist of
prosecution; truth telling and the investigation of past violations;
consideration for victims’ rights, remedies and reparations; vetting,
sanctions and administrative measures; memorialisation, education and
the preservation of historical memory; traditional, indigenous and
religious approaches to justice and healing; institutional reform and
effective governance.
As has been made abundantly clear, Ethiopia chose to deal with
impunity by prosecuting those responsible. Prosecution alone, however, is
not a solution for the post-conflict reconstruction. There are other
associated measures one must take to bring about peace, justice and
reconciliation. The following seven measures – including prosecution –
will be addressed briefly within the framework of post-conflict justice. 
3.1 Prosecution 
As noted above, Ethiopia’s response to the violence during the Derg has
chiefly been engaging in a massive project of prosecuting suspects who
planned the crimes and those who carried out those criminal plans.
Ethiopia, among others, opted for this solution as a matter of political
expediency.7 For what it is worth, the Ethiopian trials represent one of the
most known, yet under-reported, completely domestic initiatives that
sought to hold perpetrators of gross human rights abuse accountable. It is
true that no post conflict justice measure would be complete without at
least prosecuting those individuals most responsible for the major human
rights violations. All other initiatives will be discredited if major actors are
sheltered from prosecution. On that account alone these trials deserve to
be hailed. In the next section the various components of the prosecution
project are examined.
3.1.1 Special Prosecutor’s Office (SPO)
The Special Prosecutor’s Office (SPO) was established in 1992 by a
proclamation issued by the House of Representatives of the Transitional
Government of Ethiopia (TGE).8 The House of Representative was not a
popularly elected body. It was a collection of individuals and political
7 See detailed discussion in K Tronvoll ‘A quest for justice or the construction of political
legitimacy? The political anatomy of the Red Terror trials’ in Tronvoll et al (n 1 above)
84-97.
8 For detailed accounts of the SPO, see S Vaughan ‘The role of the Special Prosecutor’s
Office’ in Tronvoll et al (n 1 above) 51-67.
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entities that formed the Transitional Government after the collapse of
Mengistu’s regime. The TGE lasted for two years. However, the collection
is relatively more representative than the post-transition parliament which
came to be fully controlled by the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary
Democratic Front (EPRDF). 
As its designation ‘special’ indicates, the prosecution’s office was
specifically constituted for this purpose and directly reports to the Prime
Minister, bypassing the Minister of Justice to which other regular
prosecutors report.9 Furthermore, unlike regular prosecutors, the SPO
enjoys powers to investigate the crimes it is empowered to prosecute.10 
The SPO, in addition to investigating and prosecuting the crimes
perpetrated, also has the mandate of producing a historic record of what
had happened. Thus, its foundational proclamation states that ‘it is in the
interest of just historical obligation to record for posterity the brutal
offences, the embezzlement of property perpetrated against the people of
Ethiopia and to educate the people and make them aware of these offences
in order to prevent the recurrence of such a system of government’.11 This
is a laudable objective, but critics blame the SPO for having used the forum
to introduce too many witnesses to allow them to air their grievances,
while he could have gotten the job done with fewer witnesses or even
through the use of documentary evidence as the crimes perpetrated were
meticulously recorded by the perpetrators themselves. 
In terms of political persuasion, the only excluding factor for the
appointment to Chief Special Prosecutor, is the fact of being a member of
the Worker’s Party of Ethiopia (WPE) or its security forces.12 However, in
light of the parties involved in conflict during the Red Terror, this should
have excluded others who were members of any of the parties that took
part in the conflict. In this regard, critics often point to the past
membership of the Chief Prosecutor in Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary
Party (EPRP), a party which is accused of firing the first shot which started
the Red Terror.13 Although it is the members and supporters of this party
who faced the full force of the Derg’s crackdown, the party, in the eyes of
many observers, committed a strategic blunder by starting urban warfare
and targeting leading members of the Derg for assassination. Thus,
appointing as a prosecutor a person who had allegedly directly or
indirectly suffered at the hands of the Derg is like appointing a holocaust
survivor as a prosecutor for the Nuremberg Tribunal.
9 Art 2(2) Proclamation Establishing the Office of the Special Prosecutor, Proclamation
22/1992 (8 August 1992).
10 n 9 above, art 6.
11 n 9 above, Preamble.
12 n 9 above, art 5(4).
13 Parliamentary discussion (n 2 above).
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Perhaps, it is not the mere fact of being a supporter or even a member
of a party that played a part in the conflict that one should be concerned
about. The Chief Special Prosecutor appears in public only on rare
occasions, is known for using highly emotive language against suspects,
and sometimes even against the bench, so putting his credibility and
objectivity on the line.14 This impression is strengthened by the fact that
the Prosecutor was not given the mandate to investigate crimes allegedly
committed by various non-state actors during the Red Terror, including a
party he once belonged to or supported. It is a historical fact that crimes
were committed by various parties to the conflict; however, singling out
the Derg, which is responsible for the bulk of the crimes, does not do justice
to the truth of what happened.
3.1.2 The charges
In his report of February 2010, the Special Prosecutor indicated that
charges were filed against 5119 suspects for genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes of murder and rape; the abuse of power and various
other crimes.15 These suspects were charged and later convicted for
violations of various pre-existing provisions of the 1957 Penal Code. The
Ethiopian Penal Code at the time was progressive in its inclusion of the
prevailing international criminal law and international humanitarian law
standards. In fact, in certain respects, it went beyond what was and still is
customarily provided in genocide-related provisions in international
treaties and various domestic laws.16 In particular, one notes the expanded
protection given to members of political groups against genocide. The
controversy surrounding this unique provision has probably been the bane
of the trials, especially in light of the political context. 
The serious crimes committed during the seventeen-year-rule by the
military are too many to be prosecuted in such a short period of time. The
acts of killing and torture committed qualify as some of the most
horrendous acts of savagery committed by men against men. The
following lists demonstrate this savagery. The killings as revealed to
Parliament by the Special Prosecutor are the following: executions;
beatings with sticks; throwing people off cliffs; throwing people into rivers
alive; strangling with a cord or nylon rope; injection of poison; electric
shock; suffocation with an anesthetic agent and then strangulation
(particularly used against the former Emperor Haileselassie). Forms of
torture include: whipping with an electric cable or leather whip after
14 In his last report to Parliament this came to light when an MP pointed this out. He was
once sentenced to a few months in prison for contempt of court when he alleged that
one of the judges on the bench was a member of Mengistu’s defunct Workers Party of
Ethiopia (WPE).
15 Report (n 2 above).
16 See FK Tiba ‘The Mengistu genocide trial in Ethiopia’ (2007) 5 Journal of International
Criminal Justice 513-28. 
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binding the victim’s legs and hands and stuffing objects into their mouths;
whipping while the victim is suspended; keeping a bound victim
suspended for long time; torture by electric shock; applying a burning
newspaper to the body; pulling out hair; mutilating the body; rubbing a dry
body or bones with a wooden board; stretching nails and nipples with
pincers; pulling out fingernails; killing or torturing others in the presence
of the victim; frightening by setting dogs on a person; taking victim for a
false execution; suspending heavy objects from men’s genitals; inserting
heavy objects into a woman’s uterus; forcing a victim with wounded feet
to walk on gravel; as well as other forms of torture not included here. 
The accused persons were grouped into three categories. The first
category included policy-makers, senior government, and military officials
of the Derg. The two other groups were ‘military and civilian field
commanders who carried out orders as well as passed orders down, and
the individuals who actually carried out many of the brutal and deadly
orders’.17 The cases of the accused persons in the first category were heard
by the Federal High Court First Criminal Division. The trials of those in
the second category were conducted in Addis Ababa in the Federal High
Court Sixth Criminal Division and in the Regional Supreme Courts. 
In Special Prosecutor v Mengistu Haile-Mariam, against top-tier accused
persons, four charges were filed.18 The first charge of public provocation
and preparation to commit genocide in violation of articles 32(1)(a) and
286(a) of the 1957 Penal Code reads:19
The defendants in violation of Articles 32 (1) (a) and 286(a) of the then 1957
Penal Code of Ethiopia beginning from 12 September 1974 by establishing
the Provisional Military Administration Council, organising themselves as
the general assembly, standing and sub-committees; while exclusively and
collectively leading the country, agreed among themselves to commit and
caused to be committed crimes of genocide against those whom they
identified as members of anti-revolution political groups. In order to assist
them carry out these, they recruited and armed various kefitegna and kebele
[administrative units] leaders, revolutionary guards, cadres and revolutionary
comrades whom as accomplices, they incited and emboldened in public
meeting halls, over the media by calling out the names of members of political
groups calling for their elimination using speeches, drawings and writings
until 1983 in various months and dates thereby causing the death of
thousands of members of political groups. 
The second charge of the commission of genocide in violation of article
281 of the 1957 Penal Code reads:20 
17 F Elegesem & GA Aneme ‘The rights of the accused: A human rights appraisal’ in
Tronvoll et al (n 1 above) 37.
18 n 17 above, 37-41.
19 Special Prosecutor v Colonel Mengistu Haile-Mariam & others Federal Supreme Court,
Criminal File 30181, 26 May 2008 17 (my translation).
20 n 19 above, 17 (my translation).
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The defendants in violation of Articles 32 (1)(a) and 281 of the 1957 Penal
Code of Ethiopia, beginning from 12 September 1974 while exclusively and
collectively leading the country by establishing the Provisional Military
Administration Council or government, organising themselves as the general
assembly, standing and sub-committees, planned, participated and ordered
the destruction in whole or in part, members of politically organised socio-
national groups thereby committed genocide. To accomplish this goal, they
created various investigation, torturing and execution institutions, hit squads
and Nebelbal army divisions; carried out campaign ‘clearing fields’, ‘free
measures’ and ‘red terror’ to kill or cause the killings of members of political
groups and cause injury to their physical and mental health or cause their
total disappearance by banishing them in a manner calculated to cause them
social harm or cause their death. 
This second charge had four components (murder; bodily harm, serious
injury to physical and mental health; placement under living conditions
calculated to result in death or disappearance; and the alternative charges
of aggravated homicide and grave and willful injury). As regards the
second charge, the prosecutor alternatively filed charges of homicide and
causing grievous bodily injury. The third charge was carrying out unlawful
detention in violation of articles 32(1)(b) and 416 of the 1957 Penal Code;
while the fourth charge was abuse of power by illegally confiscating private
property worth millions of Birr in contravention of articles 32(1)(b) and
414 of the same Penal Code. 
3.1.3 The trials
The Special Prosecutor filed charges against Colonel Mengistu Haile-
Mariam and others in December 1994 while most of the accused were in
detention since May 1991. The trials of some accused, including Colonel
Mengistu Haile-Mariam, were conducted in absentia. The trials are
currently being finalised after eighteen years. A number of death penalties
have been imposed. At the time of writing, none of the imposed capital
punishments has been carried out. Under Ethiopian law, the President
must certify that such a punishment may be carried out.21 
3.1.4 The verdicts
In this section, the verdicts of the Ethiopian courts in major Red Terror
cases, notably those involving Colonel Mengistu and his co-accused, are
briefly examined.22 The first obstacles to the viability of the charges filed
were overcome on 9 October 1995 with the Federal High Court First
21 Art 117(2) Criminal Code of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, May 2005.
22 The decisions in Special Prosecutor v Colonel Mengistu Haile-Mariam have been covered
elsewhere. See K Tronvoll, C Schaefer & GA Aneme ‘Concluding the main Red Terror
Trial: Special Prosecutor v Colonel Mengistu Haile-Mariam et al’ in Tronvoll et al (n 1 above)
136-152; Tiba (n 16 above).
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Criminal Division’s rulings on the preliminary objections mounted by the
defendants. The defendants’ lawyers raised various objections, ranging
from technical matters relating to the charges to that of the sustainability
of the charge of the crime of genocide. 
The objections raised by the defence were briefly as follows: the
inclusion of political groups as protected groups against genocide under
article 281 of the 1957 of the Ethiopian Penal Code is incompatible with
international law; the victims’ political groups allegedly targeted were not
legally registered political parties; the charges did not distinguish between
the crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity as article 281 of the
1957 Penal Code itself lumps the two crimes together; the accused persons
should not concurrently be charged for crimes of provoking (inciting) the
commission of the crimes of genocide and for actually committing them; it
is improper to charge the accused both for genocide and alternatively for
aggravated homicide due to the significant differences between the nature
of both crimes, the number of victims and the consequences of conviction;
that the accused enjoyed immunity from prosecution; that the accused
should be tried by an international court as the national court established
by a transitional government lacked legitimacy and the accused have the
right to choose a court according to article VI of the Genocide Convention
and article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.23 These
objections were rejected one after another by the Federal High Court,
paving the way for the continuation of the case to the merits phase. Similar
objections were also rejected by the Federal Supreme Court of Appeal as
will be shown later.
Many years later in 2006, in a landmark decision, the Federal High
Court returned a verdict in the case of Special Prosecutor v Colonel Mengistu
Haile-Mariam & others, convicting the accused.24 In a majority judgment of
two to one, the court convicted the accused of genocide while the
dissenting judge found them guilty of aggravated homicide. The
sentencing judgment was not unanimous, with the majority going for life
while the dissenting judge favoured capital punishment. Both parties
appealed. The Special Prosecutor thought that the imposition of a life
sentence was too lenient, while the accused contested both the conviction
and the sentence. 
The Federal Supreme Court in 2008 upheld the conviction of the
accused, reversed the life sentence and imposed the death penalty on the
persons most responsible, including Mengistu Haile-Mariam (in absentia).
The judgments and sentencing decisions have been covered elsewhere and
23 For a discussion of the rulings, see S Yeshanew on www.oxfordlawreports.com
(subscription required) International Law in Domestic Courts (ILDC) on the Case of
Special Prosecutor v Colonel Mengitu Haile-Mariam & Others. 
24 Tiba (n 16 above).
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will not be repeated here.25 It is only necessary to pose critical remarks
about the judgments as indicated below. 
3.2 Critique of the trials26
As has been indicated before, the trials are not without their problems.
Without denying their symbolic significance, it is prudent to highlight
some of the most-often cited weaknesses. These critiques relate to the
rights of the accused; the issue of victor’s justice; their length; problems
relating to defense legal counsel; and that some of the trials were held in
absentia. 
3.2.1 The rights of the accused
Some of the most trenchant critiques of the Derg trials as well as other Red
Terror trials relate to protections offered to suspects. Commentators have
roundly criticised the new regime for failing to accord full fair trial
guarantees to those accused. Here, one considers among others, the right
to an expeditious trial, access to and choice of counsel and the right to be
present at one’s trial and its corollary – the right to confront one’s accusers
and witnesses. Before considering these issues, the general accusation of
victor’s justice, which has a bearing on the broader question of justice and
the role or impact of politics on criminal prosecutions, is addressed below.
3.2.2 Victor’s justice and the role of politics
Like many trials conducted after a change in regimes in Africa at the end
of an armed conflict, and like its historical antecedent – Nuremberg - the
prosecution of the Derg era crimes has not been immune to accusations of
‘victor’s justice. These accusations mainly stem from the historical
circumstances surrounding the beginning of the ‘Red Terror’ which the
Derg portrayed as a reaction to the ‘White Terror’ initiated by the
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP) that targeted officials of
the Derg in the cities. Although EPRP and its alleged members were met
with unmatched brutality for their infractions in the cities, the Derg
believed that it was defending itself and the revolution. Nevertheless, it
bears noting that EPRP was not part of the coalition that overthrew the
Derg, and it was in fact undermined and outmaneuvered by the TPLF (a
core within the EPRDF coalition) early on. However, a previous split
within the EPRP created a splinter group that later joined the EPRDF.
25 n 22 above.
26 This section is based on my yet unpublished work, ’Mengistu and Red Terror Trials’ in
G Musila Domestic prosecution of international crimes and the role of regional organizations:
Some African case studies Institute of Security Studies, South Africa (forthcoming). I
would like to thank Godfrey Musila for his comments on this section.
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Most of the leaders of this coalition partnership were high-ranking officials
of the TGE, including a Prime Minister. Some of these still wield
significant power in the government. Although there has not been any
public information about the individual culpability of these former
members of the EPRP who became part of the TGE, it was thought unfair
that the actions of those who belonged to the EPRP and other radical
groups were not subjected to investigation and prosecution.
The other complaint relates to crimes committed in the context of the
armed conflict. Accordingly, even if the Derg sought to stamp out the
armed resistance in various parts of the country using brutal tactics in
violation of the laws and customs of war, it could not be said for sure that
the rebels themselves never resorted to such tactics. Thus, an honest and
objective prosecutor could not have proceeded against only one side of the
conflict. In short, the selective prosecution of members of the Derg, while
there are also other people who could have been made to bear
responsibility for the ultra-radicalisation of a generation and their
victimisation, is an example of victor’s justice in operation. Although it
was legally imperative and the right thing to prosecute Derg officials, one
could argue that the process was not designed to get to the bottom of the
country’s past problems. The idea that the trials were aimed at bringing
about internal reformation of the system by punishing perpetrators loses
some credibility due to the perceived partiality of the process.
3.2.3 Problems related to delay, pre-trial detention and the right to 
expeditious trial
International human rights and international criminal law guarantee the
accused’s right to a free, fair, and expeditious trial. The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as well as the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights to which Ethiopia is a party, unequivocally
affirm these guarantees.27 These rights also have an equivalent protection
in the statutes of the various international criminal tribunals.28 The
Constitution of the Federal Government of Ethiopia that came into effect
in 1995 contains similar rights.29 
27 Art 14 (3) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights UN Doc A/6316
(1966), entered into force 23 March 1976,; art 7(1)(d) African Charter on Human and
Peoples Rights, OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/ 3 Rev 5 (1981) (entered in to force 21
October 1986); see also art 6(1) European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 213 UNTS 222, entered into force 3 September
1953.
28 The Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR require the Tribunals to ensure that a trial is ‘fair
and expeditious’. See art 20(1) Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, UN Doc S/Res/827/Annex (1993); art 19(1) Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal For Rwanda, UN Doc S/Res/955/Annex (1994); art
67(1)(c) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A/Conf. 138/9, 1998.
29 Art 20(1) Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.
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The Derg trials as well as the other Red Terror trials were criticised for
delays in their completion.30 The Derg-WPE trial alone took 13 years to
complete, excluding two to three years of pre-trial detention for suspects
arrested when EPRDF took over in 1991. The majority of suspects were
arrested by triumphant EPRDF forces without warrants and did not
appear in court for three years after their arrest. They had been
incarcerated for more than 10 years before judgment was rendered. Some
were also kept in detention without being charged for a lengthy period of
time during the early phases of the prosecution.31 That is a long time by
any standard, and far removed from the test of a ‘reasonable period of time’
demanded by all human rights standards and treaties. However, one
misses the point by simply focusing on numbers alone. Trials of such
magnitude are not easy to prosecute. Even the International Criminal
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda are still in business,
despite the large number of resources they enjoy and the limited number of
suspects they have been able to try. As will be shown below, the usual
suspects – lack of resources and the complexity of the cases – are present
in Ethiopia’s case too. The question would then be whether there was
anything the SPO or courts could have done to speed up the process within
the bounds of the resources and goodwill they had at the beginning.
At the beginning, suspects were not arrested through the usual process
by means of court-issued arrest warrants.32 The prosecution’s decision to
seek the mass arrest of all those implicated meant that the Prosecutor
himself was bound to be overwhelmed by the number of cases he had to
investigate. There was a risk of flight of suspects. In fact, many who feared
arrest did flee at the beginning. Apart from clogging the system and
dividing the attention of the SPO, the mass detention of suspects increased
the risk of prolonged detention of individuals against whom there was no
sufficient evidence. There have been cases where individuals were in
detention for 10 years, but received only a six-year jail sentence. Neither
the SPO, nor the Ethiopian courts had any remedy for those unduly
detained for a long time. The unusual decision to prosecute both high
ranking and low ranking members of the Derg in part created the situation
such that there were far too many to be tried. The lesson here is that the
SPO should first have focused on the most serious cases.
Apart from the number of perpetrators, the prosecutorial strategy was
in general problematic. Once the trial started in 1994, the strategy devised
by the SPO in presenting its evidence, mainly witness testimony, ensured
that the trial would take longer than was necessary. The SPO introduced
far too many witnesses to prove certain issues. For instance, the SPO has
30 For possible causes that contributed to the delay, see Vaughan (n 8 above) 52-53.
31 See J Mayfield ‘The prosecution of war crimes and respect for human rights: Ethiopia’s
balancing act’ (1995) 9 Emory International Law Review 553.
32 Human Rights Watch/Africa (1994) 11 Ethiopia: Reckoning under the law 19 http://
www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/45cc5ece2.pdf (accessed 15 March 2009).
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been criticised for calling many witnesses who testified about ‘the
commission of the alleged acts without an identification of who the actors
were’.33 Haile-Mariam records that by 1998, the Prosecutor had called
more than 500 witnesses and was promising to call another 500, in
addition to physical evidence.34 Kidane has pointed to the limited utility
of the many witnesses being called noting the following:35 
Of the 581 prosecution witnesses, about 90% of them testified about isolated
incidents that happened over an extended period of time. For example, more
than 300 witnesses testified that they saw, one or more of the victims listed in
any of the 211 counts in prison, and either heard the killing on the radio, read
in the newspaper, or saw the corpses at one or another place. Many of them
were relatives of the victims who witnessed the taking of their loved ones from
their homes and their death or disappearance. And others told the Court
about the prison conditions and the severity of the torture.
Given that the accused were top policy and decision-makers and in
consideration for the need for a speedy trial, the preferable strategy for the
SPO would have been to present evidence that showed the existence of a
common plan among the co-accused to commit the alleged acts.36 It was
also imperative to prove that the accused was not only implicated in his
leadership capacity but also personally had committed or ordered the
commission of such acts or had participated in the commission in a certain
capacity. However, very few prosecutor witnesses were able to point to the
direct participation of most of the accused in the act.37 In other words, the
witnesses probably contributed little to the trial which the prosecutor might
have proved with documentary and physical evidence, as well as records
of the triumphant radio and television broadcasts that followed most
executions of the so-called counter revolutionaries or enemies of the
revolution. 
It appears that the SPO, by choosing this strategy wanted to create a
forum for witnesses, most of whom were affected in some way, to vent
their sorrow and testify in public against leaders who were responsible for
some of the most atrocious crimes. In a sense, it is like trying to ‘kill two
33 WL Kidane ‘The Ethiopian “Red Terror” trials’ in MC Bassiouni (ed) Post-conflict justice
(2002) 685.
34 Y Haile-Mariam ‘The quest for justice and reconciliation: The International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda and the Ethiopian High Court’ (1998-99) 22 Hastings International
& Comparative Law Review 679, citing ‘Trial of former Derg officials once again
adjourned’ Addis Tribune 24 July 1998.
35 n 35 above, 685-686.
36 n 35 above, 685.
37 However, testimonies of the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th witnesses were found to be well
organised. The 43rd witness had also testified to an event that directly implicated
Capitain Legesse Asfaw and Major Berhanu Bayeh; the 183rd witness testified about
the death of her very well known novelist husband (Behalu Girma); the 356th witness
saw the execution of 13 detainees in an interrogation room; the 482nd who was
Mengistu Haile-Mariam personal guard (himself in prison) who testified about the
killing of the former Derg Chairman, General Teferi Benti and other Derg officials. See
Kidane (n 33 above) 688-689.
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birds with one stone’ at the expense of a speedy trial. Views vary on
whether these two goals may be achieved at once. The defence team
objected to the prosecutor’s strategy, arguing that the approach suited a
truth commission, rather than an adversarial courtroom scenario.
Expressing displeasure, one defence counsel noted that ‘if what SPO is
trying to do is record keeping, it could be done more effectively by a truth
commission; it need not be done in a court room’.38 
The SPO originally enjoyed a lot of goodwill and was able to attract
donor’s direct assistance to help it prosecute cases in line with international
standards. The assistance consisted in direct financial support as well as
technical assistance.39 Although not significant in monetary terms, the
continued support nonetheless waned due to the deterioration of the
relationship between the SPO and international donors.40 The
deterioration in their relationship was chiefly attributed to factionalism
and an internal power struggle within the SPO.41 Eventually, donors either
reduced or withdrew from the programme. One of the donors to withdraw
its support was the Carter Center, which had in the past assisted the SPO
by sponsoring forensic experts from Argentina.42 Foreign consultants were
also fired for suspicious activities.43 Clearly, the SPO could have benefited
from support from the donor community. As it turned out, the honeymoon
did not last more than two years and the SPO had to continue on its own
thereafter. 
Ethiopian courts are generally plagued by backlogs and a lack of
sufficient trained personnel. Although the trials in Addis Ababa were
assigned to at least three divisions (1st, 2nd, and 6th) of the Federal High
Court, the judges’ task was not limited to trying such cases. They had to
juggle these high profile cases with their other judicial commitments. On
balance, however, the delay is rather because of the Prosecutor’s strategy
that led to his inability to wrap up the prosecution’s case in time. In
hindsight, however, talking about delays in relation to those convicted and
sentenced to life in prison or death may seem academic. What about those
acquitted after a lengthy detention? The truth is that it has been done for
those people; no apology has been offered and there have been no
instances of reparation for unjustified detention. In terms of international
criminal law as currently codified by the Rome Statute, anyone who has
been the victim of unlawful arrest, detention or miscarriage of justice has
an enforceable right to compensation.44 Failure to compensate suspects
38 Kidane (n 33 above) 688.
39 T Howland ‘Learning to make proactive human rights interventions effective: The
Carter Center and Ethiopia’s Office of the Special Prosecutor’ (2000) 18 Wisconsin
International Law Journal 419-420.
40 As above, 419, for the committed support.
41 n 39 above, 422-423.
42 n 39 above.
43 n 39 above, 423 (fn 46).
44 Art 85 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
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who suffered a long period of detention or a miscarriage of justice is
another significant way that the Ethiopian trials failed to meet
international standards.
3.3.4 Right to adequate legal counsel
Adequate legal counsel is a right guaranteed to accused persons in criminal
trials under domestic and international law.45 This right entails that the
accused person be allowed to be represented by a legal counsel of his/her
choice, and be provided with one at the state’s expense if he/she is unable
afford one. 
The court appointed thirty-six attorneys for some of the high-profile
suspects from among private law practitioners, while a few others were
retained by their clients.46 The court-appointed lawyers were paid five
thousand Ethiopian Birr (750USD at the then prevailing exchange rate) to
defend an accused.47 This was the only payment they received for a trial
that took nearly thirteen years.48 Furthermore, they were not reimbursed
for the expenses they incurred in connection with the preparation of their
cases.49 This clearly shows the relative position of disadvantage in which
the defence teams stood. 
The government also established the Public Defenders Office (PDO) in
January 1994 under the supervision of the Ethiopian Supreme Court. The
PDO was to provide legal assistance to the indigent accused.50 The PDO
started its work with five Ethiopian lawyers early in 1994, only one of
whom was an experienced trial attorney.51 This pales in comparison to
thirty lawyers and four hundred investigators put at the disposal of the
SPO at the beginning of the trial.52 The PDO was established mainly to
defend low-level suspects.53 At its early stages, it was reported that the
PDO suffered from lack of resources.54 The PDO was also staffed with
newly graduated and inexperienced staff. Clearly, the quality of the
services and the resource allocated to defend indigent accused were
inadequate.55
45 Art 21(4) ICTY Statute; art 20(4)(d) ICTR Statute; art 67(1)(d) Rome Statute; art 20(5)
Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (1994).
46 Haile-Mariam (n 34 above) 723.
47 n 39 above.
48 H Tsadik Prosecuting the Past … Affecting the Future? A SIDA Minor Field Study of the
Ethiopian Transitional Justice Trials, Department of Peace and Conflict Research,
Uppsala University (2007) http://www.pcr.uu.se/pcr_doc/mfs/mfs_Tsadic.pdf
(accessed 9 April 2010).
49 Haile-Mariam (n 34 above) 724.
50 Human Rights Watch/Africa (n 32 above) 49.
51 As above, 49-50.
52 Haile-Mariam (n 34 above) 723.
53 Human Rights Watch/Africa (n 34 above) 50
54 As above.
55 For prosecutorial resources and assignment of counsel at the Ethiopian Court, see
Haile-Mariam (n 36 above) 722-724.
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The work of the defence counsel was also made difficult because no
right to discovery existed in criminal trials in Ethiopia.56 This meant that
the Prosecutor was under no obligation to share incriminatory or
exculpatory evidence with the defence before the trial. 
In general, although the defence was put at a relative disadvantage in
terms of resources, there has always been the impression that they carried
out their jobs with integrity and in the interest of their clients. There were,
however, certain instances in which some of the accused dismissed their
assigned lawyers to conduct their own defence. It is also worth mentioning
that lawyers representing the accused are thought not to have been
harassed by members of the public or by the government.
3.3.5 Trials in absentia
As noted already, a number of those suspected of Derg era crimes had fled
the country by the time EPRDF took Addis Ababa or did so soon
thereafter. Mengistu fled to Zimbabwe where he still lives. The SPO
decided to charge those who fled anyway and they were subsequently tried
in absentia. Trials in absentia are controversial under both international and
domestic law. Most international instruments provide for the accused’s
right to be present at his or her trial, although they do not outrightly
prohibit trials in absentia. Treaty rules on trial proceedings, such as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (article 14(3)) and the
European Convention on Human Rights (article 6(1)) have been
interpreted by the relevant tribunals as not ruling out trials in absentia.57
While article 12 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal
allowed trials in absentia, the Statute of the ICC in article 63(1) requires the
accused to be present for the trials to commence. The Statutes of the ICTY
(article 21(4) (d), and ICTR (article 20(4) (d)) also provide that the accused
has the right ‘to be tried in his presence.’ 
However, the position seems different under a number of domestic
jurisdictions.58 In terms of articles 160 and 161 of the Ethiopian Criminal
Procedure Code, a trial in absentia is allowed if the accused fails to show up
for his trial after being summoned and notified to do so, including
publication of summons in a widely-circulated paper, provided the offence
committed is punishable with rigorous imprisonment not less than twelve
years.59 This is a common feature of criminal trials in most civil law
countries that follow the inquisitorial system of criminal litigation, unlike
56 See also Human Rights Watch/Africa (n 32 above) 50-51.
57 A Casesse International criminal law (2008) 390-391.
58 As above, 390.
59 In terms of art 162, where the court decides to hear the case in the absence of the
accused, the judge must order the publication of the summons showing the date fixed
for the hearing and a notification to the accused that he will be tried in his absence if he
fails to appear.
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the adversarial systems.60 Antonio Cassese gives two reasons why trials in
absentia are admissible in Romano-Germanic legal traditions.61 Firstly, the
investigating judge gathers evidence not only for the prosecution but also
for the defence, which means that when the trial proceedings begin, the
court has exculpatory evidence available, and is therefore in a position to
evaluate both the evidence against and that in favour of the accused.
Secondly, in most civil law systems (including those such as Italy where
the accusatorial system has been adopted) it is considered that the interest
of the community adjudicating alleged criminal offences should prevail
over the right of the accused to be present in court, at least whenever the
accused voluntarily tries to evade justice.
Although Ethiopia follows a predominantly civil law system with
regards to its substantive law, its procedural law is mainly adopted from
common law jurisdictions.62 That means its Criminal Procedure Code
does not include an investigative judge, a feature common to inquisitorial
systems. In the same breath, it also has to be pointed out that the role of the
judge in criminal trials in Ethiopia is not as limited as its adversarial
counterpart. It incorporates features from both systems. But this mix does
not make up for the lack of an investigative judge, who in other civil law
systems is responsible for collecting both exculpatory and incriminatory
evidence for the sake of seeking the truth. Furthermore, the Ethiopian
prosecutor is not under any special legal duty to reveal any exculpatory
evidence to the court, a matter that is critical in trials in absentia. 
As we noted previously, certain accused persons have been found
guilty in absentia and have been given the death penalty. There has so far
been only one instance, which this author is aware of, where a convicted
person was deported back to Ethiopia to serve a sentence imposed in
absentia. The accused, Kelbesa Negewo, was found guilty and sentenced to
life imprisonment by the Federal High Court on 20 May 2002. He was
deported from the United States in October 2006, stripped of his US
citizenship on the ground that he lied to immigration officers about the
human rights violations he had committed. He was also found liable to his
former victims under the Alien Tort Claims Act. He is currently serving life
in prison.
Courts have also rejected the plea by another accused through his
lawyer to have his in absentia decision set aside. This happened in the case
of General Embibel Ayele v Special Prosecutor, where the Federal High Court
refused to set aside the accused’s in absentia conviction and life
60 Casesse (n 57 above) 360.
61 n 57 above, 360-361.
62 Its 1961 Criminal Procedure Code was drafted by Sir Charles Mathew was mainly
based it on the Malayan Criminal Procedure Code, while its Civil Procedure Code,
drafted by Ato Nerayo Isayas, was heavily inspired by its Indian counterpart.
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sentence.63 On appeal, the Federal Supreme Court ruled that in absentia
decision can only be set aside when the accused appears before the court -
either in person or accompanied by his lawyer according to article 127(1)
of the Criminal Procedure Code. 
3.3 Truth telling and investigation of past violations 
Because of the trials, we now know more about what had happened. At
least some of the relatives who did not know about the fate of their loved
ones were for the first time made to face the truth of what had happened.
Many bodies were exhumed and laid to rest. The remains of the Emperor
Haileselassie I had to be exumed from underneath Mengistu Haile-
Mariam Secretary’s Office. Former government archives have been
opened up to the prosecution and some of these documents have been
submitted to the courts and have become part of the official account of who
committed some of these crimes. It is hoped that these documents will be
digitised and put in a museum, be it physically or electronically. 
On the other hand, prosecution by its very nature does not reveal the
entire truth. The adversarial nature of the process naturally prompts the
parties to use or vie for winning strategies. Calls for the establishment of a
truth and reconciliation commission (TRC) were never given serious
thought by the EPRDF which formed and run the government since Derg
lost power. There has not been any public consultation on the matter.
Members of the transitional parliament who passed the SPO Proclamation
were not elected by the public. It seems that the ruling party is dead-set
against a TRC. The Federal High Court in its ruling of 9 October 1995
made the point that courts are not legally empowered to decide whether
national reconciliation is the best option.64 Prosecution and TRCs need
not be mutually exclusive. In fact, some of those convicted had indicated
a willingness to seek forgiveness from the public by telling the truth
unconditionally. For unexplained reasons this has not been accepted by
the government either. This leaves one with a question of why the
government is afraid of the truth. 
3.4 Consideration for victims’ rights, remedies and 
reparations
Principle three of Chicago’s Principles on Post-Conflict Justice requires
that states shall acknowledge the special status of victims, ensure access to
justice, and develop remedies and reparations. The Ethiopian trials have to
63 General Embibel Ayele v Special Prosecutor Criminal Appeal File 34459 Federal Supreme
Court. The application to set aside could be made pursuant to arts 196 and 201(1) of
the Criminal Procedure Code.
64 Special Prosecutor v Col Mengistu Haile-Mariam & Others Federal High Court, First
Criminal Division, Ruling on Prelimenary Objections 9 October 1995 para 90.
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a large extent allowed victims and victims’ families access to the courts. At
the beginning, the SPO’s investigation was assisted by the victims’ and
their families who came forward and provided information about the
crimes committed and those responsible. At a later stage, some have
appeared before courts and provided their testimonies. 
The participation of victims go only to the point of assisting the
prosecution. So far there has not been any mention of remedies or
reparation for the victims individually or collectively. Restitution of
illegally confiscated property in the context of red terror is not known. The
judgment of the courts do not provide for any reparation measures for the
victims. The government has no plans to compensate the victims of these
violations, nor has it apologised to the public although it is not responsible
for these violations. Given the destitution of most of the suspects, there has
not been any civil suit against them for compensation. For the same
reason, it is unlikely that any future civil suits will be filed. 
3.5 Vetting, sanctions and administrative measures
As an aspect of post-conflict justice, states should carry out vetting,
sanctions and administrative measures against suspects of human rights
violations during transition. The defeat of the Derg was total: among
others, the government was dismantled; the constitution was suspended
and courts reconstituted; the Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE) was
declared illegal; and its security, intelligence, police and military forces
were disbanded. At the end, all key positions were filled by the members
and loyalists of the rebels who ousted the Derg. 
When it comes to the judiciary, most if not all experienced judges were
dismissed from their jobs on the ground that they belonged to the Marxist
Worker’s Party of Ethiopia. This took its toll on the judiciary which was
already understaffed. It is understandable that the judiciary has to be free
of partisan politics. However, in those days, it was unlikely to find any key
government official who was not a party member. Some care should have
been exercised before depriving the judiciary of its most experienced
personnel. 
Overall, the vetting exercise has made it difficult for individuals with
questionable human rights records in the past government to be involved
in the transitional government and afterwards. However, it also created a
situation whereby all key positions were given to partisans of the new
regime.
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3.6 Memorialisation, education and the preservation of 
historical memory
According to the Chicago Principles, states should support official
programmes and popular initiatives to memorialise victims, educate
society regarding political violence and preserve historical memory. These
memorialisations may include:65
built memorials such as monuments, statutes and museums; sites of
memorialisation such as former prisons, battlefields or concentration camps;
and, commemorative activities including official days of mourning, renaming
streets, parks and other public sites and various forms of artistic, social and
community engagement with past violations. 
There is no question about the relevance of such programs. Post-conflict
measures have to go beyond merely dealing with the past. The new
generation has to be taught about the horrors of the past so as not to repeat
them.
Memorialisation efforts regarding the victims of the Red Terror have
usually been spearheaded by the victims’ associations themselves. There is
no doubt that they receive some government support to that effect.
However, it needs to be pointed out that the government has so far taken
a back-seat in regards to efforts of memorialisation and preserving the
historical memory.
3.7 Traditional, indigenous and religious approaches to justice 
and healing
The justification for encouraging such forms of dispute settlement is their
legitimacy. Thus, ‘traditional, indigenous and religious approaches to
justice have high levels of local legitimacy and are generally integrated into
the daily lives of victims, their families, communities and the larger
society’.66 The majority of Ethiopians are deeply religious people and in
touch with their diverse cultures. It is hardly possible to imagine that these
religions and cultures have nothing to contribute to the healing and
reconciliation process if they were allowed to play a role.67 However, the
purely legalistic approach adopted by the government made it impossible
for this to happen. On the other hand, even organised religious groups
rarely venture out of their comfort zone and engage in such meaningful
national exercises. This, in part, could be explained by the past and
65 n 5 above, 34.
66 n 5 above, 36.
67 For an attempt to show the existence of restorative justice traditions in Ethiopia which
the legalist approach sidelined, see C Schaeffer ‘The Red Terror trials versus traditions
of restorative justice in Ethiopia’ in Tronvoll et al (n 1 above) 68-83.
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continued association of these religious establishments with the ruling
regime. In the current Ethiopia, this association pervades all aspects of
civic life where it is rare to find an independent institution which dares to
question the official line and proposes an alternative approach. 
3.8 Institutional reform and effective governance
The last of these important Chicago Principles of Post-Conflict Justice
urges states to engage in institutional reform to support the rule of law,
restore public trust, promote fundamental rights and support good
governance. Again, the importance of these is not hard to see.68 The gains
from well-planned and executed accountability mechanisms could easily
be reversed if these efforts are not followed through by institutional reform
and effective governance that can restore the public’s trust in government.
How has the Ethiopian government fared on these issues?
It would be irresponsible not to admit that there have been some
fundamental structural changes towards a better future. Regardless of the
political disagreement about the government structure, the 1994
Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia entrenched
fundamental rights and freedoms, established key institutions and
guaranteed their independence, at least on paper. However, the human
rights practice of the incumbent regime has been subjected to severe
criticism to the extent of prompting some to openly claim that the Derg had
been better since it did not recognise human rights to begin with, let alone
mowing down people who believed it was their right do so under the
Constitution as has happened in post-Derg era. In other words, the rights
in the Constitution are there only to enhance the democratic credentials of
the incumbents in the eyes of western donors without whose support the
regime could not survive and could not have become what it is today. This
is a serious indictment of the regime’s performance.
4 Concluding remarks
The human rights abuses committed by the Derg in Ethiopia from 1974 to
1980, including the Red Terror era, represent only a portion of the human
rights violations that occurred during the Derg’s seventeen-year-rule.
Ironically, the prosecution of the suspects took nearly eighteen years,
longer than the Derg’s stay in power. The big fish, Colonel Mengistu Haile-
Mariam, is still at large, sheltered by Zimbabwe. Given his key role in what
had happened during his rule, one cannot underestimate the impact his
capture and surrender will have on the Ethiopian justice system as well as
on the victims.
68 For more see GA Aneme ‘Beyond the Red Terror Trials: Analyzing guarantees of non-
repetition’ in Tronvoll et al (n 1 above) 116-135.
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This brief essay examined the Ethiopian process in light of the Chicago
Principles of Post–Conflict Justice which provide a holistic and
interdisciplinary approach to the business of transitional justice. Seen in
light of this framework, Ethiopia’s endeavor is found wanting. In its favour
it may be said, however, that the Ethiopian experience represents a home-
made, albeit legalistic, response to a legacy of human rights abuses.
Despite the trials’ shortcomings, it is fitting to say ‘better late than never’.
Furthermore, no two wrongs make a right. Some have been tempted to
delve into a comparison of the incumbent regime’s bad human rights
record with that of Mengistu’s to downgrade the symbolic significance of
the Red Terror trials both for Ethiopia and Africa.
Despite the fact that the Ethiopian judiciary had to deal with this novel
issue, it wasted an ideal opportunity for dialogue with the burgeoning
jurisprudence of international criminal courts. In fact, it could be said that
the courts progressively lost touch with international and comparative
materials as the trials progressed. While the Federal High Court in its first
ruling on preliminary issues in 1995 engaged with substantive
international law, albeit in favour of the prosecution’s case, its decision on
merit in 2006 as well as the decision of the Federal Supreme Court in 2008,
are both found wanting with respect to their legal rigour and international
comparative significance. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the
Ethiopian courts have rendered an important contribution to the law on
genocide, especially at the domestic level.
